Rövid leírás:
Civil wars are one of the most pressing problems facing the world. Common approaches such as mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping have produced some results in managing ongoing civil wars, but they fall short in preventing civil wars in the first place. Incentivizing Peace shows that considering civil wars from a developmental perspective presents opportunities to prevent the escalation of nascent, low-level armed conflicts to full-scale civil wars.
Több
Hosszú leírás:
Civil wars are among the most difficult problems in world politics. While mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping have produced some positive results in helping to end civil wars, they fall short in preventing them in the first place. In Incentivizing Peace, Jaroslav Tir and Johannes Karreth show that considering civil wars from a developmental perspective presents opportunities to prevent the escalation of nascent armed conflicts into full-scale civil wars. The authors demonstrate that highly-structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs such as the World Bank, IMF, or regional development banks) are particularly well-positioned to engage in civil war prevention. When such IGOs have been actively engaged in nations on the edge, their potent economic tools have helped to steer rebel-government interactions away from escalation and toward peaceful settlement. Incentivizing Peace provides enlightening case evidence that IGO participation is a key to better predicting, and thus preventing, the outbreak of civil war.
Th[is] book significantly advance[s] our understanding of the determinants of peace in conflict-affected countries.
Több
Tartalomjegyzék:
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
2 CivilWar Management
3 IGOs and CivilWars
4 Empirical Record
5 The Logic of Institutional Influence
6 Case Evidence
7 Conclusion
